Beyond Christianity, Part 2


Image from

A friend on Facebook recently posted a Fox News video about “liberal agitators” at a Trump rally. Being that this was from Fox News, the agitators they chose to show were not particularly articulate. I was milliseconds away from forgetting all about it until I saw this comment beneath the video:

“They’re being paid to protest.”

I seriously doubt that’s true, but for the sake of the ethical analysis I hope to carry out, let’s just assume a shadowy cabal is paying inarticulate protesters to harass Trump rallies. In the formal Christian analysis, I hope to show that such an action is morally wrong. In the ethical Christian analysis, I think we will also find that clandestine payments to anti-Trump protesters is wrong. In my proposed alternative moral system, well, you’ll just have to wait to the end of the article.

So let’s begin with the formal Christians. As I conceptualized them in the previous “Beyond Christianity” article, the formal Christian’s ethics are based on two assumptions – “I am good” and “I am part of the establishment.” The formal Christian, upon discovering the shadowy anti-Trump cabal must necessarily condemn the payments.

After all, such underhanded techniques undermine lawfulness and our traditional values about open discourse. These payments represent an attempt to corrupt our tradition of democratic elections and they are dishonest. We can join hands, walk across our lawns and denounce the shadowy cabal for corruption, lies and lawlessness.

Unfortunately, any new or better group of people wanting to reform our cherished establishment are necessarily going to be outside our traditions and laws. Since the formal Christian is good and part of the establishment, the new or better group is necessarily evil from the formal Christian’s point of view. This makes our moral analysis a bit of an extermination campaign against progress.

There’s also the problem of what we do with this analysis. I suppose we can attempt to suppress the cabal in the hopes of vanquishing dishonest politics forevermore, however unlikely that seems to succeed and however likely that project seems to spell doom for the forces of progress.

The ethical Christian will also condemn secretly paying protesters, but for different reasons. The cabal’s paying protesters, the ethical Christian will point out, is an attempt to thwart the will of the oppressed (and therefore good) normal people by the powerful (and therefore bad) cabal. By allowing rich (and therefore bad) groups to influence elections and campaigns, the cabal is institutionalizing structures of injustice and oppression.

Once again, what we do with this analysis is a puzzling question. Suppression again, I guess? The problem there, in addition to the fact that suppression is awfully hard to accomplish, is that in order to suppress the powerful (and thus bad), the ethical Christian must become powerful (and thus bad) enough to overthrow the original villain. Any successful suppression of evil, therefore, will involve the creation of a new bad guy. I don’t know how to escape this cycle except to have the hero commit suicide or otherwise die at the moment of triumph, which seems a bit impractical. It also seems like that best case scenario creates a power vacuum.



The first step in my proposed alternative is to take all your notions of justice and stuff them in the nearest recycling bin. Heroes and villains do not exist in this realm, at least not in the forms commonly recognized. Good and bad are still things, but we no longer believe in evil and condemnation is a waste of time. We are officially uninterested in moralizing of any type.

This probably sounds like moral nihilism or amorality and, in a sense, I can see why you’d think so. Indeed, this project began when I was a moral nihilist because I wanted to avoid the problems previously mentioned regarding ethical and formal Christianity. That said, nihilism can’t distinguish any good from any bad and thus falls apart when we try to use it as a moral system.

How then to get away from moralizing without slipping into nihilism and nothingness? My proposed solution takes two roads, reducing moral values to their absolute minimal states and emphasizing consequentialism over moral intentions.

First, the reduction of moral values. I don’t include freedoms in my list of essential good things because it is perfectly possible for conscious beings to live without freedom. I likewise don’t include equality, humility, charity, generosity or fairness in the essential goods because, like freedom, people can, do and have survived without them.

This is not to say I would recommend you become a tyrannical, elitist, arrogant, selfish and arbitrary jerkass, but simply that I reject most traditional values as universally good. Freedom, charity etc would, for me, slot into an inferior category of contextual goods. By this I mean that it is often good to live in a state of freedom, but not always and not in all contexts. 

The higher categories of absolute goods and absolute bads would include only four things. The absolute goods are continued existence and the imposition of meaning on reality. The absolute bads are extinction and meaninglessness. Why? Because without existence we cannot have meaning and without meaning existence is barren.

(I do think there is a hierarchy of existences and meanings, but I’ll get to them in another essay.)

You will perhaps notice that this morality is consequentialist.  Hindsight is 20/20, you might say. I really don’t have an answer to this other than to admit I’m guilty as charged. However, I can counter by saying that in our day to day lives, we are generally isolated from intentions but we are never isolated from outcomes. Getting a paycheck from a person who intended to defraud me but failed is every bit as useful as getting a paycheck from someone who is wholeheartedly devoted to my happiness.

This is not to say intentions don’t matter, and indeed, my likelihood of getting next months pay check are better if my boss is good-intentioned, but it is to say we are ultimately judged by outcomes and that, as such, outcomes are the ultimate arbiter of good and bad.

A necessary consequence of this outcome-focused morality is to admit that, when we perform an action, we can’t actually know if it is good or bad at the time. We can estimate the probabilities of our actions being good or bad, but we can never be certain. I’d be lying if I said this bothers me very much, but perhaps greater minds than my own will find what I’d consider unavoidable ethical uncertainty objectionable.

So, let’s go back to the cabal that keeps sending paid protesters to Donald Trump rallies. Dishonesty is no longer necessarily bad, so we can’t automatically cry foul just because the cabal is playing tricks. Being strong or manipulating the people is, likewise, no longer automatically a bad thing so we’ve successfully escaped the realm of Christian ethics, whether those Christians be of the formal or ethical flavors.

Since our absolute goods are simply continued existence and meaning and we can’t know if we’re being good or bad in the moment, our ethical analysis of the cabal reduces to a matter of estimating probability.

Does Donald Trump winning the election seem good for our continued existence and our continued ability to impose meaning on reality? This answers is of course hugely dependent on context but, if we estimate that the answer is yes, Trump is “good,” we must next decide if the cabal’s action is likely to hurt Trump, and thus be “bad.”

If, on the other hand, we estimate that Trump winning the election is bad for our abilities to exist and impose meaning, we must then estimate if the cabal’s actions are likely to stop Trump and thus become “good.”

My personal analysis would come down to something like this: Trump is unlikely to be “good” if he becomes president, though he could be “good” in any number of other contexts. However, the cabal’s actions are so likely to backfire that they will probably end up helping Trump. As such, Trump is bad and so is the cabal.

It seems to me this system of morality avoids most of the previously mentioned problems. This analysis also seems likely to be much more useful to the cabal, to Trump supporters and to Trump opponents than either of the Christian analyses. This is because it leads naturally away from moralizing and naturally toward cool-headed analysis.

Almost nothing is inevitably good, including the formal Christians, and almost nothing is inevitably bad, including the powerful who so bother the ethical Christians. Context triumphs over absolutism in all cases except where existence ends.


  1. Ben, a thought experiment. You go out backpacking in the wilderness (do you have wilderness in South Korea?) with your best friend and he is badly mauled by a bear (do you have…?). He is literally dying in your arms when he grabs your head, pulls it close to him, and tells you that he has $1m buried somewhere close that nobody else knows about. He will tell you where it is buried but he wants your solemn promise that you will use the money to take care of his two children. With tears in your eyes, you promise to do this. Your friend dies and you retrieve the buried treasure. You don’t earn much while teaching and you could certainly use $1m. Do you keep your promise and if so, why?

    According to your code of ethics “outcomes are the ultimate arbiter of good and bad.” The best outcome for you is to keep the money as nobody else knows about it. The only reason to keep your promise is because you think keeping your promise is the right thing to do, but this is contrary to your beliefs, as you have already instructed us to stuff all our traditional notions of morality into the trash can.

    1. Oh yes, there’s some lovely wilderness out here. Unfortunately, it’s not very close to me. My current home is basically St. Louis – a big city surrounded by farms. When I get a little older, I’d love to build a house out in Gangwon Province, spend my days walking along mountain streams and my nights watching the Milky Way. I might even find a sun bear or two.

      As for your thought experiment, in most cases I’d keep my promise. We talked about it before with my concept of “social meaning,” but I’d estimate that two kids have more existence and more society than I, assuming I’m alone, do. Why? Well, they’re younger and will probably exist longer than I will and there are two of them, but only one of me. Another practical reason is that, in my experience, trust is an incredibly valuable asset. I want people to tell me about buried treasures when they die, and I can’t expect that if I develop a reputation for stealing their things.

      Now, if I’m the leader of an orphanage full of starving children I cannot hope to otherwise support, sorry friend, I’m taking that money. I really need to get into the hierarchies of existence and the hierarchies of meaning to fully explain this.

  2. So, in the final analysis it all comes down to whose ox is being gored, n’est-ce pas? Since outcomes can only be viewed in retrospect we cannot pass either a positive or a negative judgment on events in progress. Therefore the beatings will continue until morale improves.

    1. I don’t think it’s all about whose ox is being gored. I think it’s about making your best estimates about how to minimize the number of oxes being gored in total, on as large a scale as possible. I need to write part three where we talk about hierarchies of meaning and hierarchies of existence to really explain how to do so, but that’s coming.

      I’m not saying we can’t pass moral judgments on things in the present, only that we need to recognize that those judgments are (very) subject to revision. For example, I made the probabilistic case that Donald Trump is bad (not evil, mind you, because we’re getting rid of that concept) because I think President Trump would likely have poor outcomes.

      However, if Trump becomes President, triples the GDP and brings about world peace, my moral judgment was clearly wrong. Why? Because that outcome invalidates my moral estimates in the presents and because I can’t know the outcome sitting here now.

      I don’t think world peace is likely from a Trump Presidency, but it is possible and so my moral judgments of his goodness or badness should be provisional in the present.

      As for beatings, I think you’ll find I’m generally pessimistic about the usefulness of punishment.

  3. Ben,
    I wonder how euthanasia or abortion would be regarded under your system. Both are inherently about discontinuing existence, which seems to violate one of the overarching values.

    I can’t get comfortable with the idea of morality arising from any one (or two) values. Of course, our moral intuitions ultimately arise from foundational instincts that evolved due to their beneficial effects on the preservation and propagation of genes, but I doubt there are many people who would want to take genetic success as their core guiding principle.

    Morality is complicated, not always logical, and attempts to boil it down to only a few precepts always seems to lead to conclusions most of us find uncomfortable. Of course, you can typically rationalize any emotionally preferred conclusion into these systems (utilitarianism, deontology, etc), but that leads me to wonder what those systems are really bringing to the table.

    1. Hey Mike,

      Good questions. For euthanasia or abortion, I think that would really depend on context. One of the reasons I’m trying to make the absolutism part of the system as small as possible is that in day to day life, being a moral relativist seems better to me. That’s also why I’m trying to say that we can’t really know if we’re doing right or wrong in the moment – morality gets dangerous when we think we can impose a monolithic moral code on life.

      Let’s say I see a baby about to be run over by a truck. It’s extremely likely that I’m doing a good thing when I scoop up the baby or stop the truck, but it’s not certain. If the baby, let’s say, grows up to detonate a nuclear bomb in downtown London, my action of saving the baby was, as far as the larger context, bad. I simply can’t know in the moment.

      It’s only in extreme situations like Aztec human sacrifice or U731 when we aren’t better off just saying “when in Rome.” However, those extreme situations do exist and we really do need a way to say things like “Stalinism is bad,” which is impossible in a completely relativistic ethics.

      The utility of my proposal, I hope, is to render morality more flexible and less serious. We don’t know, we probably can’t know, all we can do is make educated guesses and try to avoid extinction or meaninglessness. In other, I’m trying to make it harder to go on a moral crusade, harder to moralize and easier to analyze things with a cool head. In other, other words, I’m trying to replace the heroes and villains, good and evil model of morality with a morality of people and things who are making good or bad estimates.

      I also think this is closer to the way people actually make decisions. The hope is that if we can more closely approximate how people actually make ethical decisions, we can better understand their behavior and better tailor our environments to accommodate them.

      1. Wow, I think this is the first I’ve heard of Unit 371 (which came up when I googled ‘U371’). Pretty horrible, particularly given the US role afterward. Glad I learned something new, although ugh.

        It almost sounds like you’re working on a sort of meta-morality, as in, what are the things we could universally condemn, even after making allowances for cultural differences. Right to exist does seem like a reasonable basis, although even if all the subjects in Unit 371 had survived, I would still see it as something that must be condemned.

        The problem is that, while many of our instincts evolved because they helped with survival, knowing intellectually that we will survive doesn’t help when we’re feeling fear or pain. We still suffer. It’s why someone being water-boarded is still being tortured. We can’t banish the deeply held aversion instinct just because we intellectually know the reason that instinct evolved isn’t present.

        I’d suggest suffering as a possible alternative, but people can suffer mentally for purely cultural reasons. Does the distress that a religious conservative feels toward someone blaspheming their sacred values count as suffering? If not, then what kind of mental suffering does count, and why?

        All of which is to say, I like the idea. I’ve pursued it myself from time to time. But I always end up chasing my tail in ever tighter circles, always collapsing back to an unsatisfying cultural relativism and the inescapable need for a broad international consensus on what is unacceptable for all cultures, unfortunately a type of might-makes-right.

      2. Yeah, Unit 731 might be the single nastiest thing I’ve ever heard of. Dr. Mengala has nothing on Shiro Iishi. It’s actually one of the things that got me started on this project because, honestly, the worst part is that the physicians and staff members running that little slice of hell weren’t cackling villains. They were normal dudes who were freaked out on their first days of work, they were dutiful husbands and patriotic soldiers.


        I think your point about suffering is a good one, and I’d like to answer it at much greater length in the next post. While I think the contexts that make waterboarding or Unit 731-style experiments acceptable are so rare as to be trivial, I still wouldn’t fit them into my system of universally bad things. I hope you stick around to critique that project.

        This series might end up being a PhD thesis for me and I’d like to get all the input I can from intelligent and thoughtful readers such as yourself.

      3. My pleasure Ben. Looking forward to the next part.

  4. The universe as expressed by Erwin Schroedinger or, even when the outcome is widely regarded as bad (Japan’s Unit 731, Hitler’s “final solution”) little chunks of good might be extracted and put to positive use. After all, done is done, why waste the results? Sometimes I think that the upper levels of Maslow’s pyramid are not all they’re cracked up to be.

    1. That’s definitely true. Actually, this kind of reminds me of Genghis Khan or Julius Casesar.

      To their enemies, at the time, these guys were about as big a disaster as can be imagined. One estimate I saw said that the Mongols reduced the population of Earth by 10%. The conquest of Gaul might have ended 2.5 million lives and that was at a time with much, much lower population densities.

      And yet, sitting here, I realize how much I enjoy being heir to traditions like paper-making, meritocracy, gun powder, the Silk Road and the Renaissance – none of which happens if Subetai doesn’t slaughter 40,000 European knights in Poland.

      Likewise, we are very indebted to the Roman empire for things like widespread literacy, our legal code, the existence and propagation of Western philosophy, advanced engineering and Europe as we know it.

      I don’t think these things fit into currently popular moral systems. :/

  5. “I’d estimate that two kids have more existence and more society than I, assuming I’m alone”

    And assuming you have two or three kids? Does that additional “existence” justify breaking your promise in this case? If so, I doubt you meet my definition of what constitutes a close friend.

    “Now, if I’m the leader of an orphanage full of starving children I cannot hope to otherwise support, sorry friend, I’m taking that money.”

    Really? Your friend did not ask you how much you needed the money before telling you his secret. He simply trusted you and you honored his trust with your promise.

    “I want people to tell me about buried treasures when they die, and I can’t expect that if I develop a reputation for stealing their things.”

    Remember, I stipulated that nobody would know what happened so that we could focus simply on the essence of what it means to make a promise.

    1. Well, now we’re changing the scenario about numbers of kids. I can’t imagine how my friend would get a million dollars, or how I would take a million dollars without consequence or anybody knowing.

      Regardless, me not giving the money to his kids constitutes a likely harm to those kids. I’d need a very compelling existential reason to harm said kids. Like I said, something like “there are a lot of people who would die without me cheating.” And I also would probably only cheat as much as I absolutely had to. Like, skimming off the top enough to take care of the people dependent on my and giving the rest to the aforementioned two kids.

      Why? I estimate that we have an interest in maintaining trust in society. I estimate that contracts are more often useful than not and thus I should not lightly cast them aside.

      So I’m going to turn this around on you. Your gored friend, reaching tenderly for your cheek, whispers his dying wish.

      “Malcolm, I’ll tell you where my million dollars is buried, but if I can’t have it, nobody can. You must promise me you’ll throw it all into the ocean.”

      Do you honor his wishes? I sure as hell wouldn’t and I wouldn’t because my friend is making a meaningless, nihilistic request.

  6. “I’d need a very compelling existential reason to harm said kids.”

    You’ve already said that the only thing that matters to you is estimating the probability of continued existence and meaning (sorry but I still have no idea what this means). In my thought experiment there is a zero percent chance you will be discovered and you now have five children without college funds. Presumably you can create more “existence and meaning” by stealing the hidden money and using it to send your children to college. Do you keep your promise and if not, why not? Why do people have to die before you would consider taking the money? Presumably all you are doing is some sort of cost benefit analysis, and in my example above the benefits of stealing the money clearly outweigh the costs, at least according to your rubric.

    “Do you honor his wishes? I sure as hell wouldn’t and I wouldn’t because my friend is making a meaningless, nihilistic request.”

    Many people, myself included, believe that your actions reflect your nihilistic beliefs while your friend’s request does not provide any such evidence. Your friend may have any number of reasons to want the money destroyed. He may believe that the money will corrupt his children or at least demotivate them (probably true). He may be honoring the promise to another. However, his reasons are irrelevant. What is important here is that you made a promise to your friend on his death-bed and then casually ignored his wishes in favor of your own. You may justify this any way you like but most people would probably agree that your actions showed that you lacked integrity and were not this man’s best friend after all. Please note that I am not saying that you, Ben, are like this. I am just trying to point out the consequences of holding the kind of positions that you have been arguing for.

    1. I’m going to explain meaning at length in part three, but for now, I’ll try to simplify. It’s the activity of conscious beings. It’s values, it’s cultures, it’s traditions and religions and art and family structures and whatever else conscious beings do. As to what those meanings end up being, I’m a relativist so long as they don’t devolving into meaninglessness (ie, everybody hooked to a morphine drip for the rest of their lives) or extinction (ie the Heaven’s Gate Cult).

      And this is why I think that in your thought experiment we’re actually testing which types of meaning are most important to you and most important to me rather than challenging the system as a whole. It is pretty clear I’m more of a consequentialist than you, but regardless, these are subjective questions within the framework I’m proposing, which is nice because you simply aren’t going to find people agreeing on these ethical dilemmas.

      Any answer you give to the question “why should I have integrity for my friend” is going to refer to a type of meaning. You are estimating the value of telling the truth very highly. I’m trying to be more contextual, but we’re both engaged in the same activity. The only real way we can be sure who is right is in hindsight.

      So, thinking about both scenarios a bit more, if the situation actually went down the way you describe, I would just refuse to promise. “Friend, I’ll try to care for your kids, but you know I’m in charge of an orphanage. I’m not promising anything” or “No, I’m not going to throw a million dollars in the ocean.”

      If I somehow can’t do that, it comes down to context. I’ll explain the context I’d use in part three.

      Let me give you an example of why I’m not going to call keeping a promise, respecting life or even being nice a universal good – Genghis Khan. Killer – oh my lord yes. Rapist – many, many times over. Liar – generally no, but sometimes when circumstances called for it. About the only good thing you can say about Genghis Khan, within a Christian ethical framework, is that he was never arbitrary. And yet, the people under his leadership built a huge chunk of the world we live in today.

      Compare him to the hundreds of (generally nicer) Slavic, Persian, Hungarian, Polish, Chinese and Korean leaders he butchered. I’m going to make the case that those leaders, by allowing their people to be destroyed, committed a far greater crime than Genghis ever did. Certainly, I’d much rather be a Mongol born in 1285 than a Song peasant. I’d much, much, much rather my kids be born Mongols in 1285 than be born as Song peasants.

      In this context, it kind of makes the niceness a moot point, does it not?

  7. Either you believe in the notion of stewardship, that you are morally obligated to honor promises made to the very best of your ability or you come down on the side of situational ethics. This is a personal choice but I, for one, would much rather deal with people, on a personal, business or any other level, who have a strong sense of stewardship. Not condemning situational ethics outright, just saying that there are too many variables in that system, making it problematic when planning future action.

    1. Do you think stewardship is less complicated? Keeping a promise that hurts people seems to be of dubious value. Deciding when a promise or duty for stewardship no longer applies seems to me, well, situational.

      In a realistic scenario, what I would probably do if I gave my word to do something and later discovered that it was hurting people is simple renegotiate the agreement.

  8. “I’m a relativist so long as they don’t devolving into meaninglessness (ie, everybody hooked to a morphine drip for the rest of their lives) or extinction (ie the Heaven’s Gate Cult).”

    Robert Nozick, in his book ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’, which I know you are familiar with, conducts a thought experiment using a hypothetical experience machine which people can plug themselves into and experience anything they want. I have asked numerous people whether they would want to be plugged into such a machine and have been surprised by the number who say they would. I’m only making this point to show that your concept of “meaningfulness” is completely arbitrary. Wanting to attach yourself to an experience machine, a morphine drip or the Heaven’s Gate cult, is as rational as any other lifestyle choice.

    “So, thinking about both scenarios a bit more, if the situation actually went down the way you describe, I would just refuse to promise.”

    Why would you refuse to promise, Ben? Why not lie to your friend? If you refuse to promise he may not tell you where the money is? All you care about is the consequentialist outcome. Your friend is going to die and nobody will know what you have done. It would be completely irrational of you not to lie to your best friend to maximize your chance of getting hold of his money.

    “About the only good thing you can say about Genghis Khan, within a Christian ethical framework, is that he was never arbitrary.”

    Not true. I don’t think Genghis Khan is a good example for you of why some people have been successful without respecting promises. Some time ago I read Jack Weatherford’s excellent book , ‘Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World’. Weatherford was the only Western scholar ever to be allowed into the Mongols’ “Great Taboo”—Genghis Khan’s homeland and forbidden burial site. Here is the blurb from the book:

    “But contrary to popular wisdom, Weatherford reveals that the Mongols were not just masters of conquest, but possessed a genius for progressive and benevolent rule. On every level and from any perspective, the scale and scope of Genghis Khan’s accomplishments challenge the limits of imagination. Genghis Khan was an innovative leader, the first ruler in many conquered countries to put the power of law above his own power, encourage religious freedom, create public schools, grant diplomatic immunity, abolish torture, and institute free trade. The trade routes he created became lucrative pathways for commerce, but also for ideas, technologies, and expertise that transformed the way people lived. The Mongols introduced the first international paper currency and postal system and developed and spread revolutionary technologies like printing, the cannon, compass, and abacus. They took local foods and products like lemons, carrots, noodles, tea, rugs, playing cards, and pants and turned them into staples of life around the world. The Mongols were the architects of a new way of life at a pivotal time in history.”

    Like the Romans, Genghis Khan could not have ruled such a wide area without widespread trust that he would always keep his word.

    “it kind of makes the niceness a moot point, does it not?”

    No, it doesn’t. Note above that Weatherford claims Genghis Khan had a “genius for progressive and benevolent” rule.

    1. The lotus eater machine is rational, I suppose, but it’s also a violation of the two basic principals. It means we go extinct. It means that our lives mean nothing. For my system, it is universally bad.

      Why not lie? Because I estimate that in the current context, being honest is a value worth maintaining. I do not estimate that it is always a value worth supporting. I would not, for example, characterize the lying and cheating that Emperor Taizong did to his father and brothers to be a bad thing since the consequences of honesty, in that context, were pretty obviously horrible.

      Also, both of his requests (ALL OF IT MUST GO TO MY CHILDREN AND TO HELL WITH YOUR ORPHANAGE/IF I CAN’T HAVE IT NOBODY CAN, TO THE OCEAN WITH IT!) are weird and if he was a real friend, he probably wouldn’t hold me to either, though I feel you’re trying to avoid practical concerns like that.

      ^ But this is still a judgment call, as it is with any moral system.

      As for Genghis Khan, I know exactly how I’d call him a successful leader, despite the rape and genocide. Ie, just that – his globalizing, socially progressive and meritocratic policies had such good consequences that, on balance, they outweigh killing 10% of the world’s population.

      What I don’t know is how you could do the same while maintaining the same sorts of standards you’re holding me and my mauled friend to. Unless it’s okay to rape and murder, but not okay to lie. And even then, I’d recommend you look into how “honest” Genghis Khan’s foreign policy was.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: